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Post-Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC), 
debt-deficit dynamics can be analyzed in two 
ways: ex-ante and ex-post.  Ex-ante analysis 
involves identifying policy changes which can 
create an impact on debt and deficits through 
the very design of the intervention.  The in-
troduction of UDAY scheme and increase in 
borrowing powers of states to 0.5 per cent 
of GSDP designed by FFC are examples of 
such ex-ante policy interventions that would 
have an impact on debt and deficit of states. 
On the other hand ex-post analysis captures 
the effect of interest rates, maturity compo-
sition of debt, inflation, and growth in real 
GDP to the changes in the pattern of debt/
GDP ratio. How much did growth in GDP 
contribute to the changes in the debt-GDP 
ratio? What impact inflation had on the size 
of debt? Did high/low primary deficits (defi-
cits-net-of interest) led to upward/downward 
bias in debt-GDP ratio? Ex-post analysis is 
not feasible at the moment (based on 2016-
17 BE), as we do not have enough data points 
to answer these questions1. Alternatively, we 
tried to analyse emerging debt and deficit 
scenarios in states based on 2016-17 BE. We 
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1The ex-post analytical framework of debt-deficit dynamics is also within the intertemporal ( the intertemporal 
budget constraint equation, Bt/Yt = (˜rt−1,t − πt−1,t − gt−1,t) Bt−1/Yt−1+deft/Yt+Bt−1/Yt−1 which accounts for 
how a nominal interest rate ˜rt−1,t, net inflation πt−1,t, net growth in real GDP gt−1,t, and the net-of-interest 
deficit debt combine to determine the evolution of the government debt-GDP ratio; where Yt is real GDP at t and 
Bt is the real value of government debt) budget constraint equation (Hall and Sargent, 2010), which is beyond the 
scope of the paper at the moment .
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also examine emerging debt-deficit scenario 
post-FFC taking into consideration flexibility 
for higher borrowing recommended by FFC.
Deficit and  Interest Payment: State wise 
Analysis
State-wise revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and in-
terest payment to revenue receipts ratio are pre-
sented in Figure 1, 2 and 3. As evident from Fig-
ure 1, eight states are expected to have revenue 
deficit in 2016-17 (BE). These states are Maha-
rashtra, Himachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Kerala and 
Haryana. However, all states combined reve-
nue account is expected to be in surplus. With 
regard to fiscal deficit, all state combined defi-
cit is expected to be below 3 per cent of GSDP 
as mandated under the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (FRA). However, 14 states have budgeted
to have fiscal deficit above 3 per cent of GSDP. 
States budgeted to have fiscal deficit more 
than 4 per cent of GSDP are Tripura, Hary-
ana, Rajasthan, Goa and Jammu & Kashmir.
 
If we consider interest payment to revenue 
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receipts ratio (IP/RR), it is highest in Punjab, 
followed by West Bengal Haryana, Gujarat, 
and Kerala with an interest outgo of more 
than 15 per cent of revenue receipts (Figure 
3). States with above all state average ratio of 
11.3 per cent (other than those above 15 per 
cent) are 7. States with below 10 per cent IP/
RR ratio are 17 including some of the major 
states like Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Mad-
hya Pradesh Bihar, Odisha and Assam. Out-
standing debt to GSDP ratio for all states 
is estimated at 22.7 per cent. For the North 
Eastern and Himalayan states this ratio is ex-
pected to be around 28 per cent (Figure 4).
Enhanced Debt Limit and Eligibility
FRA mandates that subnational gov-
ernments in India maintain zero reve-
nue deficit or revenue surplus and a fis-
cal deficit threshold of 3 per cent of GSDP.
The FFC envisaged that the quality of defi-
cits is equally significant as the levels. 
FFC prescribed the following conditions 
for enhanced borrowing limits of States:
i. Fiscal deficit of all States will be anchored 
to an annual limit of 3 per cent of GSDP. The 
States will be eligible for flexibility of 0.25 
per cent over and above this for any given 
year for which the borrowing limits are to 
be fixed if their debt-GSDP ratio is less than 
or equal to 25 per cent in the preceding year.
ii. States will be further eligible for an ad-
ditional borrowing limit of 0.25 per cent of 
GSDP in a given year for which the borrow-
ing limits are to be fixed if the interest pay-
ments are less than or equal to 10 per cent of 
the revenue receipts in the preceding year.
iii. The two options under these flexibili-
ty provisions can be availed of by a State 
either separately, if any of the above crite-
ria is fulfilled, or simultaneously if both the 
above stated criteria are fulfilled. Thus, a 
State can have a maximum fiscal deficit-GS-
DP limit of 3.5 per cent in any given year.
iv. The flexibility in availing the additional limit 
under either of the two options or both will be 
available to a State only if there is no revenue 
deficit in the year in which borrowing limits are 
to be fixed and the immediately preceding year.
We examine the eligibility of states for ad-
ditional borrowing powers based on FFC 
condition in the first year of assessment, i.e., 
2015-16. Enhanced market borrowing of 
states for 2015-16 is analysed based on the 
four criteria proposed by FFC. A two-step 
methodology is followed for identifying the 
states for enhanced borrowing procedure:
Step 1: Identify the states within the fis-
cal deficit upper-bound of 3 per cent 
of GSDP and with no revenue deficit.
Figure 5: First Year ex-post to FFC: Final States with Combined Eligibility for Enhanced 
Debt Procedure for 2015-16 (parameters fixed for 2013-14)
IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.
Source: Finance Accounts and CSO, 
Govt of India (various years)
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Step 2: Within the subset find out states 
with interest payments-to-revenue re-
ceipts-ratio below 10 per cent; and debt-
to-GSDP-ratio below 25 per cent.
The analysis of outstanding debt and defi-
cits of all States ex-post to FFC period in the 
first year of assessment (2015-16) revealed 
that only five States – Jharkhand, Karnata-
ka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and Sikkim, 
have successfully managed the FRA thresh-
olds of deficits and the criteria of outstand-
ing debt to GSDP below 25 per cent and 
IR/RR ratio below 10 per cent (Figure 5). 
Therefore, they are eligible for enhanced 
debt procedure suggested by FC to 0.50. Gu-
jarat, Meghalaya and Uttarakhand were el-
igible for partial enhanced borrowing pro-
cedure as either of the IR/RR or Debt/GSDP 
was maintained within the stipulated limits. 
As this recommendation was implement-
ed from the fiscal year 2016-17, these states 
did not benefit out of this enhanced bor-
rowing facility. As per the information ob-
tained from Ministry of Finance, Govern-
ment of India, in 2016-17, six states have 
become eligible for enhanced borrowing limit.
To conclude, we need to emphasise that all 
states revenue account is expected to have 
a revenue deficit in 2015-16 (RE). Revenue 
surplus estimated at 0.13 per cent of GSDP 
in 2016-17 (BE) may slip into revenue deficit 
if there is a revenue short fall or increase in 
revenue expenditure more than what is bud-
geted. Since almost half of the states have a 
fiscal deficit target higher than FRA limit in 
2016-17 (BE), fiscal consolidation at the state 
level under new framework of borrowing 
proposed by FFC should focus on quality of 
expenditure and elimination of revenue defi-
cit. One major concern that emerges out of 
this analysis is that some of the major states 
(in terms of GSDP) are expected to slip into 
revenue deficit in 2016-17 BE. The rationale 
of the new framework of borrowing is to 
provide fiscally prudent states with addition-
al borrowing for higher capital expenditure. 
As per FFC’s assessment, state level capital 
outlay during its award period is expected to 
increase from 3.83 per cent of GDP in 2015-
16 to 4.61 per cent of GDP in 2019-20. The 
success of this enhanced borrowing would be 
judged both by the increase in the number of 
states qualifying for this facility and by the in-
crease in capital expenditure at the state level.
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